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iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001), the Utah Supreme Court has
jurisdiction of this appeal from the Amended Order entered February 20, 2001 (R. 26668), the Order entered May 21, 2001 (R. 433-35) and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order entered June 28, 2001 (R. 460-74).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT THAT UTAH
LAW PRECLUDES THE INTRODUCTION OF HANDWRITING
EVIDENCE UNLESS THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESS IS DEAD OR
UNAVAILABLE
OR
THE
PRESUMPTION
AFFORDED
ACKNOWLEDGED AND RECORDED DEEDS IS OVERCOME BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE?
The district court's determination that Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10, 57-2-14 and

57-4a-4 preclude the introduction of handwriting evidence unless the subscribing
witnesses to the deeds are dead or unavailable or the presumption afforded acknowledged
and recorded deeds is overcome by clear and convincing evidence should be reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved below with Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Orders and
Memorandum in Support of Motion. (R. 437-41).
II.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 104(A)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE
EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF FORGERY?
The district court's decision to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a)

of the Utah Rules of Evidence should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).

439186.1

This issue was preserved below with Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Orders and
Memorandum in Support of Motion. (R. 437-41).
III.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
UNABLE TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION AFFORDED
ACKNOWLEDGED AND RECORDED DEEDS BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE?
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff

failed to overcome the presumption afforded acknowledged and recorded deeds should be
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved below with Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Orders and
Memorandum in Support of Motion. (R. 437-41).
IV.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
PURSUANT TO RULE 104(A) OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE?
The issue of whether the district court's decision to hold an evidentiary hearing

pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence violated the Utah Constitution
should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Plumb v. State of Ulah, 809 P.2d 734,
741 (Utah 1990).
This issue was preserved below with Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Orders and
Memorandum in Support of Motion. (R. 437-41).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS
L

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This appeal concerns a dispute between plaintiff/appellant Rosalind Cazares, as

co-personal representative of The Estate of Rosemary Cosby ("Plaintiff), and
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defendant/appellee Robert C. Cosby ("Robert Cosby") over several parcels of real
property that were owned by Robert Cosby and his wife, Rosemary Cosby, as joint
tenants, prior to her death in January 1997. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that
various deeds relating to these parcels of real property, including quit claim deeds and
deeds of trust, were forged by Robert Cosby. (R. 1-33). Plaintiff asked the district court
to void the deeds and to quiet title in all of the real property in her free and clear of any
claim of the defendants/appellees. (R. 1-33). The only evidence Plaintiff offered in
support of her forgery claim was a two-page report of George J. Throckmorton
("Throckmorton Report") that stated that the signatures on some of these deeds do not
"appear to be genuine signatures of Rosemary Cosby." (R. 208-209). These deeds,
however, were acknowledged by notaries and recorded in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office. Thus, the presumption of genuineness afforded these deeds under
Utah law may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiff failed to
submit sufficient evidence at the evidentiary hearing to satisfy her burden of proof and
therefore the district court properly dismissed the Complaint. (R. 460-74).
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING THE TRUST DEED EXECUTED
IN FAVOR OF CHASE MANHATTAN.
Among other transactions, Plaintiff is attempting to void a trust deed executed by

Rosemary Cosby and Robert Cosby in favor of defendant/appellee Chase Manhattan
Mortgage Corporation ("Chase Manhattan") on or about August 18, 1995 ("Chase
Manhattan Trust Deed"). (R. 1-33). The Chase Manhattan Trust Deed secures a first
mortgage in the amount of $595,000 on the real property that served as the marital
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residence of Rosemary and Robert Cosby ("Deer Hollow Property"), who were married
from 1975 until Rosemary Cosby's death in January 1997. (R. 460-68).
A.

Acquisition of the Deer Hollow Property.

In approximately 1982, Rosemary Cosby acquired the Deer Hollow Property. At
the time she acquired the Deer Hollow Property, she was married to Robert Cosby. On
March 31, 1983, Rosemary Cosby executed a Deed of Trust on the Deer Hollow Property
in favor of Banco Mortgage Company to secure her first mortgage in the amount of
$500,000 ("Banco Trust Deed").
B.

United Security Loan and Deed of Trust.

In November 1994, Rosemary Cosby and Robert Cosby wanted to refinance the
Banco loan. In connection with the refinancing, Rosemary Cosby executed a Quit Claim
Deed on November 2, 1994 conveying the Deer Hollow Property to Rosemary Cosby and
Robert Cosby as joint tenants ("Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed").

(R. 326-27).

Rosemary Cosby and Robert Cosby then executed a Deed of Trust in favor United
Security Financial, Inc. in the amount of $420,000 ("United Security Trust Deed"). (R.
333-34). The proceeds of the United Security loan were used to pay off the Banco Loan.
The Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed was notarized by Linda Weir on November 2,
1994 and recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on November 7, 1994 as
Entry No. 5961124 in Book 7051 at Page 355. (R. 326-27). It was re-recorded on April
20, 1995 Entry No. 6064377 in Book 7136 at Page 2180-81 to correct the legal
description. (R. 325). The Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed indicated that when recorded,
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it was to be mailed to "Rosemary Cosby, 3188 Deer Hollow Drive, Sandy, Utah 84093."
(R. 325-27).
The United Security Trust Deed was witnessed and notarized by Tarci D. Carlson
on November 2, 1994 and recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on
November 7, 1994 as Entry No. 5961125 in Book 7051 at Page 356-62. (R. 333-34).
At no time prior to her death did Rosemary Cosby object to the United Security
loan or challenge the validity of the Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed or the United Security
Trust Deed. (R. 460-68).
C.

Chase Manhattan Loan and Deed of Trust

In August 1995, Rosemary Cosby and Robert Cosby refinanced the United
Security first mortgage on the Deer Hollow Property. In connection with the refinancing,
Rosemary Cosby and Robert Cosby executed a Deed of Trust in favor of Chase
Manhattan in the amount of $595,000 ("Chase Manhattan Trust Deed"). (R. 387-90).
The Chase Manhattan Trust Deed and other related loan documents were notarized by
Tarci D. Eastburn formerly known as Tarci D. Carlson.1 The Chase Manhattan Trust
Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on August 23, 1995 as
Entry No. 6149398 in Book 7212 at Page 2933-38. (R. 387-90). The proceeds from the
Chase Manhattan loan were used to pay off the United Security loan. A check for the
remaining proceeds was issued jointly to Rosemary Cosby and Robert Cosby.

1

Tarci D. Eastbum also notarized the United Security Trust Deed.
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At no time prior to her death did Rosemary Cosby object to the Chase Manhattan
loan or challenge the validity of the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed. (R. 460-68).
III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on February 18, 1999. In the Complaint, Plaintiff

alleged that the Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed and the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed were
forged by Robert Cosby. Plaintiff did not allege that the United Security Trust Deed was
forged by Robert Cosby. (R. 1-33).
After filing the Complaint, Plaintiff failed to take any action to move this case
forward for almost two years until Chase Manhattan filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Prosecute on October 18, 2000. (R. 177-85). Although the district court denied the
Motion to Dismiss at a hearing on January 9, 2001, the district court cautioned Plaintiff
that the case would not be allowed to languish any further and that the district court
intended to move it forward expeditiously. (R 244-45).
To this end, the district court held a scheduling conference on January 17, 2001 at
which the parties discussed Plaintiffs forgery claim.

It was determined that an

evidentiary hearing would be held to determine whether Plaintiff had sufficient evidence
of forgery to proceed to trial. The district court explained that if Plaintiff did not have
sufficient evidence of forgery, the case would be dismissed.

The district court

established a discovery schedule for the forgery claim and scheduled the evidentiary
hearing for May 21, 2001. (R. 249-50; 254-56; 266-68). At no time did Plaintiff object
to proceeding in this manner. (R. 443-50).
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During the ensuing months, the parties proceeded with discovery on the forgery
claim.

The parties exchanged witness lists.

(R. 257-59; 269-74; 278-83; 289-93).

Plaintiff served interrogatories and document requests on the defendants/appellees,
including Chase Manhattan. (R. 286-88). Plaintiff filed a package of documents with the
district court entitled "Copies of Documents Bearing the Forged Signature of Rosemary
Cosby" on March 21, 2001 (R. 333-34). The Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed and the
United Security Trust Deed were included in this package of documents. The United
Security Trust Deed, however, is not mentioned in the Throckmorton Report. (R. 208209; App. Brief Addendum 6). Plaintiff did not depose any of the notaries or any of the
defendants, including Robert Cosby.
On April 13, 2001, the district court held a status conference.

At the status

conference, counsel for Robert Cosby indicated that he intended to file a Motion in
Limine based on Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 57-2-14. The district court established
dates for the briefing of the Motion in Limine. Although Plaintiff expressed concern over
the briefing schedule, Plaintiff did not object to the evidentiary hearing itself. (R. 35556).
Robert Cosby filed the Motion in Limine on April 19, 2001. (R. 378-84). Chase
Manhattan filed a Memorandum in Support of the Motion in Limine on April 25, 2001.
(R. 387-90). In opposition to the Motion in Limine, Plaintiff filed a memorandum with
the Throckmorton Report attached as an exhibit.

(R. 391-99). After briefing was

completed, the district court heard oral argument on May 14, 2001. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the district court granted the Motion in Limine and held that prior to
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submitting handwriting evidence, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she had sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption afforded acknowledged and recorded deeds under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10, 57-2-14 and 57-4a-4. (R. 431).
Although Plaintiff was given the opportunity to present such evidence at the
evidentiary hearing held on May 21, 2001, Plaintiffs evidence was woefully lacking.
With respect to the Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed notarized by Linda Weir, Plaintiff did
not offer any evidence to discredit her acknowledgement. Rather, counsel for Plaintiff
merely argued that Ms. Weir's signature appeared to be "different" on each of the deeds.
Ms. Weir, who appeared voluntarily at the request of Robert Cosby, testified that all of
the signatures were hers. The district court, who had the opportunity to evaluate this
testimony, obviously found her testimony credible.
Plaintiff offered no evidence to challenge the validity of Tarci (Carlson)
Eastburn's acknowledgement of the United Security Trust Deed. Plaintiff did not allege
in the Complaint that the United Security Trust Deed was forged nor was the Untied
Security Trust Deed mentioned in the Throckmorton Report. (R. 1-33; 208-209; App.
Brief Addendum 6). Thus, Plaintiff clearly failed to sustain her burden of proof with
respect to the United Security Trust Deed.
To attack the acknowledgement of the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed, Plaintiff
relied solely on a "medical record" which purportedly established that Rosemary Cosby
was in Florida on August 18, 1995 and the statement in Ms. Eastburn's affidavit that she
did not "specifically recall this particular notarization" but that her "normal procedure"
with Rosemary Cosby "was to have discussions with Rosemary [Cosby] as to the papers
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that she was going to sign [and that] [o]ftentimes she would be out of town when the
closing was to take place and would sign the papers in advance of closing." (App. Brief
at 12-13; R. 397-99; 416-18).
Plaintiff did not call Ms. Eastburn as a witness even though she lives in Salt Lake
City and was available to testify at the evidentiary hearing. (R. 460-68). Instead,
Plaintiff attempted to create the inference that the acknowledgement was invalid because
Ms. Eastburn did not specifically recall the Chase Manhattan transaction. (App. Brief at
21). The district court properly rejected this inference because there is nothing in the
affidavit that suggests that Ms. Eastburn did not acknowledge the Chase Manhattan Trust
Deed.

Ms. Eastburn's testified in her affidavit that she knew Rosemary Cosby

personally, that she had been involved in several transactions with Rosemary Cosby, and
that she always verified with Rosemary Cosby that the signatures on the various
documents were in fact hers when such documents were signed outside Ms. Eastburn's
presence. Plaintiff offered no evidence to contradict these statements. (R. 416-18; 46068).
As for the "medical record" offered by Plaintiff, she did not call the physician who
supposedly signed or created the record or the custodian of the record. Thus, the district
court properly refused to admit this unsigned and unauthenticated documents.2 The
district court did, however, permit Plaintiff to proffer the contents of the documents and
the documents were attached to Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to Chase

2

Plaintiff has not challenged this ruling of the district court. (App. Brief 1-24).

439186.1

9

Manhattan's Motion in Limine. (R. 460-68; 391-99). In any event, the "medical record"
does not establish that Rosemary Cosby was in Florida on August 18, 1995. The
"medical record" consists of a two-page memorandum from Robert Estrada dated
October 13, 1995 and an unidentified, unsigned page of entries for Rosemary Cosby that
includes an entry for August 18, 1995. The first page of the memorandum is on the
letterhead of the Foot and Ankle Association of Florida. It states that the patient is
Rosemary Cosby, the treating physician is Robert J. Estrada, and that her initial office
visit was October 13, 1995. The second page of the memorandum is signed by Robert J.
Estrada.

There is no indication on the memorandum that there is an enclosure or

attachment to the memorandum. The page which includes an entry for August 18, 1995
is not on letterhead, is not signed, and does not otherwise identify the physician or the
location of the physician. (R. 397-99).
With the absence of any other evidence to discredit the acknowledgments, it was
clear that Plaintiff would be unable to meet her burden of overcoming the presumption
afforded acknowledged and recorded deeds by clear and convincing evidence.
Consequently, the court dismissed the Complaint. (R. 432; 460-74).
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Orders, which was denied by the
court as untimely and without merit. (R. 437-41; 475-78). Plaintiff then filed this appeal
on July 16, 2001. (R. 479-81).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court correctly dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff was unable
to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption afforded the
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Chase Manhattan Trust Deed, which was acknowledged and recorded. Under Utah law,
Plaintiff was precluded from presenting evidence of handwriting to challenge the validity
of the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed unless Ms. Eastburn, the notary who acknowledged
the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed, was unavailable or Plaintiff presented clear and
convincing evidence challenging the validity of the acknowledgement. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 57-2-10, 57-2-14 and 57-4a-4. Because the object of the subscribing witness'
signing of a deed is to attest that the deed was executed and that the witness is ready to
certify to its genuineness, Utah law "points to the subscribing witness as the first persons
[sic] to look to in such cases for proof, and the proper ones to furnish proof in the first
instance of the due execution of the deed, in all cases when it is attacked, or when its
validity is in any manner called into question." See Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co., 14 P.
338, 339 (Utah 1887).
Plaintiff failed to submit credible evidence to overcome this presumption and the
district court properly dismissed the Complaint. This Court should affirm the district
court's dismissal of the Complaint.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT UTAH
LAW PRECLUDES THE INTRODUCTION OF HANDWRITING
EVIDENCE UNLESS THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESS IS DEAD OR
UNAVAILABLE
OR
THE
PRESUMPTION
AFFORDED
ACKNOWLEDGED AND RECORDED DEEDS IS OVERCOME BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Utah law provides that a deed that is acknowledged and recorded gives "rise to a

presumption of the genuineness and the due execution and delivery of the deed" which
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must be given "great weight."

The effect of such acknowledgement "will not be

overthrown upon a mere preponderance of the evidence, but it must be clear and
convincing [evidence]." See Northcrest Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trusl Co., 248 P.2d 692,
694 (Utah 1952) (citing 1 C.J.S., Acknowledgments, § 139).
This presumption has been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l), which
provides that a recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to
the real property affected:
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by
the person purporting to execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and the person on
whose behalf it is executed are the persons they purport to
be;
(c) the person executing the document was neither
incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time
between dates on the document and the date of recording;
(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created
or described by the document acted in good faith at all
relevant times;
* * *

(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document,
including without limitation recitals concerning mergers or
name changes of organizations, are true.
(emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 57-2-14 further require that the proof of the
execution of any conveyance of real estate be made by the testimony of the subscribing
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witness.

If the subscribing witness is dead or unavailable, then evidence of the

handwriting of the party may be introduced:
The proof of the execution of any conveyance whereby real
estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be:
(1) by the testimony of a subscribing witness, if there is one;
or,
(2) when all the subscribing witnesses are dead, or cannot be
had, by evidence of the handwriting of the party, and of a
subscribing witness, if there is one, given by a credible
witness to each signature.
Utah Code Ann. §57-2-10.
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the
subscribing witness or witnesses, shall be taken unless the
officer taking the same shall be satisfied that all the
subscribing witnesses to such conveyance are dead, out of the
jurisdiction, or cannot be had to prove the execution thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §57-2-14.
In other words, the "subscribing witness is the first persons [sic] to look to in such
cases for proof, and the proper one to furnish proof in the first instance of the due
execution of the deed, in all cases when it is attacked, or when its validity is in any
manner called into question." See Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co., 14 P. 338, 339 (Utah
1887). Indeed, the object of the subscribing witness' signing of a deed is to attest that the
deed was executed and that the witness is ready to certify to its genuineness. Id.
Applying these principles, the district court correctly determined that Utah law
precluded the introduction of the Throckmorton Report until Plaintiff established by clear
and convincing evidence that the acknowledgment on the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed
was invalid. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the district court did not preclude Plaintiff
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from "introducing any expert evidence as to forgery." (App. Brief at 4). Rather, the
district court properly required Plaintiff to first establish her prima facie case of forgery.
This distinction is important. To establish a prima facie case of forgery of acknowledged
and recorded deeds, Plaintiff was required to introduce clear and convincing evidence
that Rosemary Cosby in fact did not appear before the notaries or otherwise acknowledge
her execution of the deeds to them.

As discussed further below, the district court

appropriately held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence to determine whether Plaintiff would be able to establish her prima facie case of
forgery.

She was not able to do so and the district court correctly dismissed her

Complaint.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 104(A)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE
EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF FORGERY.
As a general rule, in order to have a case submitted for jury consideration, a

plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against the
defendants. See Gregory v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 329 P.2d. 407, 408 (Utah 1958). As
the "gatekeeper," the district court properly decides preliminary questions, which include
pure questions of fact, interpretations of law, and mixed questions of fact and law. See
21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure,
§ 5052 (1977). The proper mechanism for determining such preliminary questions is an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Utah R.
Evidence 104(a).
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In this case, the admissibility of the Throckmorton Report depended on whether
Plaintiff could overcome the presumption afforded recorded and notarized deeds. Thus,
the preliminary question to be answered by the district court was whether Plaintiff had
sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption. This is really no different than a
district court holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a) to determine
whether a declarant believed that his death was imminent prior to admitting a hearsay
statement under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive how the district court's decision to allow Plaintiff to present her evidence of
forgery at an evidentiary hearing could ever be an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
Rule 104(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to determine this preliminary question.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUBMIT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION AFFORDED ACKNOWLEDGED
AND RECORDED DEEDS BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
As stated above, Plaintiffs evidence regarding the acknowledgment of the Deer

Hollow Quit Claim Deed, the United Security Trust Deed and the Chase Manhattan Trust
Deed was woefully lacking. The sparse "evidence" offered by Plaintiff, at best, showed
that one of the notaries - Patricia A. Tunson - did not strictly comply with the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-1 et seq. (R. 460-68). This is not enough to
satisfy Plaintiffs burden by clear and convincing evidence.
As for the transactions involving the Deer Hollow Property, Plaintiff offered no
evidence to discredit the acknowledgements on the United Security Trust Deed and the
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Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed. Rather counsel for Plaintiff merely argued that Ms.
Weir's signature on the Deer Hollow Quit Claim Deed appeared to be "different" from
her signature on other acknowledgments. Ms. Weir, however, testified that all of the
signatures were in fact hers and the district court found her testimony to be credible. (R.
460-68).
Similarly, Plaintiff offered no credible evidence to discredit the acknowledgment
of the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed.

Plaintiff was not precluded from calling Ms.

Eastburn as a witness. She simply chose not to do so. Instead, she purported to rely on
the affidavit of Ms. Eastburn, which established that, although she did not recall this
specific transaction, she knew Rosemary Cosby personally, she had been involved in
several transactions with Rosemary Cosby, and she always verified with Rosemary
Cosby that the signatures on the various documents were in fact hers when such
documents were signed outside Ms. Eastburn's presence. Plaintiff offered no evidence to
contradict these statements. (R. 416-18; 460-68).
Further, Plaintiffs statement that Ms. Eastburn's acknowledgment "violated the
law" because "Rosemary Cosby sometimes signed documents before closing presumably
out of the presence of the notary" is not supported by the plain language of the notary
statute. (App. Brief at 12-13). The notary statute does not require that documents be
signed in the notary's presence. It simply requires that signer has "admitted, in the
notary's presence, having signed the document voluntarily for its stated purpose." Utah
Code Ann. § 46-1-2(1). This is consistent with the law in other jurisdictions that it is not
necessary to the validity of the notary's acknowledgment that the acknowledged
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document be signed in the notary's presence. See e.g., In re David Buchholz, 224 B.R.
13, 17 (D.NJ. 1998); Stallings v. Poteete. 702 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986);
Walker v. City of Jacksonville. 360 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978).
Plaintiffs reliance on Northcrest supra, is also misplaced. In Northcrest the
notary admitted that the signer did not appear before her or otherwise acknowledge the
deed. In light of this admission by the notary, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to
offer expert testimony that the signature on the deed was forged. Thus, the trial court
properly allowed expert testimony after the presumption of the acknowledgment had
been overcome by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., the testimony of the notary that
she did not "acknowledge" the deed. 248 P.2d at 694. Here, all of the notaries testified
that they did in fact acknowledge the deeds and this testimony was not contradicted. (R.
460-68).3
Plaintiff also claims that "everyone knew that Rosemary Cosby was in Florida" on
August 18, 1995. (App. Brief at 12). Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not call one witness at
the evidentiary hearing to testify regarding Rosemary Cosby's whereabouts on August
18, 1995. Nor did Plaintiff call any witnesses to authenticate the unsigned "medical
record" which allegedly established that Rosemary Cosby was in Florida on August 18,
1995. And, contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, these "medical records" do not establish

3

Moreover, even if the district court admitted the Throckmorton Report, the
Throckmorton Report does not conclude that the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed was a
forgery. It simply states that the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed "was a poor quality copy
and the degree of scientific certainty was reduced. However, there are indications this
was also a simulated forgery." (App. Brief Addendum 6) (emphasis added).
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that Rosemary Cosby was in Florida on August 18, 1995. The memorandum on the
letterhead of the Foot and Ankle Association of Florida does not show that Rosemary
Cosby was in Florida on August 18, 1995. Rather, it states that Rosemary Cosby's initial
office visit was at the Foot and Ankle Association of Florida was on October 13, 1995.
There is nothing in the memorandum that indicates that Dr. Estrada saw Rosemary Cosby
on August 18, 1995 or that the unsigned, undated page of entries is part of the medical
records of the Foot and Ankle Association of Florida. (R. 397-99). Indeed, such an
assumption would be belied by the memorandum itself, which states that the "initial
visit" of Rosemary Cosby to the Foot and Ankle Association of Florida was
approximately two months later.
Finally, the fact that Plaintiff did not have any credible evidence does not mean
that the evidentiary hearing was a "gesture" on the part of the district court. (App. Brief
at 4). Plaintiff had every opportunity to present her evidence and the lack of evidence
speaks to the merit of her claims of forgery, not the fairness of the proceedings.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
PURSUANT TO RULE 104(A) OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff further argues that a "basic rule of constitutional fairness was breached in

this case" because she was "compelled] to produce her evidence of forgery" at the
hearing. (App. Brief at 19-20). Plaintiff merely cites Article 1, Sections 7, 10 and 11 of
the Utah Constitution in support her argument. (App. Brief at 19). Not surprisingly, she
does not cite any case law at all, much less any case law that supports her argument.
Indeed, the district court did not violate the Utah Constitution by holding the evidentiary
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hearing because Plaintiff was given adequate notice of the evidentiary hearing and an
opportunity to meaningfully participate in the evidentiary hearing.
As this Court has explained, in our judicial system all parties are "entitled to
notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court and to an opportunity to
present evidence and argument on that issue before decision."

A "failure to give

adequate notice and opportunity to participate can constitute a denial of due process
under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution." Plumb v. State of Utah, 809 P.2d
734, 743 (Utah 1990). In other words, a hearing that is "prefaced by timely notice which
adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they must be prepared to meet"
satisfies due process. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
These standards were clearly met in this case.

Plaintiff was notified of the

evidentiary hearing, including the issues that were to be considered by the court at the
hearing, on January 17, 2001, which was more than four months before the evidentiary
hearing held on May 21, 2000. Plaintiff was given the opportunity to conduct discovery.
Plaintiff was also notified that the scope of the hearing had been narrowed as result of the
district court's granting of the Motion in Limine. Plaintiff was given the opportunity to
meaningfully participate in the evidentiary hearing. The fact that Plaintiff did not have
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption afforded acknowledged and recorded
deeds does not mean that she was prevented from presenting what sparse "evidence" she
did have.
Finally, Plaintiffs argument that the evidentiary hearing and subsequent dismissal
of her Complaint violated the jury trial and open courts clauses of the Utah Constitution

439186.1

19

is also without merit. (App. Brief at 19-20). This Court rejected such an argument over
fifty years ago in Raymond v. Union Pac. R. Co.:
It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff that this decision
[dismissing his complaint] has deprived him of his
constitutional right to a jury trial. That contention has been
urged upon this court in almost every case of nonsuit and
directed verdict brought before us. This court is charged with
the duty of protecting all of the rights of all litigants. This is
especially true of those fundamental rights guaranteed by the
State and Federal Constitutions. But the right to have a jury
pass upon issues of fact does not include the right to have a
cause submitted to the jury in the hope of a verdict where the
facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is not entitled to
relief.
191 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 1948). Thus, the district court's dismissal of the Complaint did
not deprive Plaintiff of a constitutional right.
Further, the open courts clause of the Utah Constitution does not apply to the
holding of an evidentiary hearing to rule on a preliminary question of admissibility, and
the dismissal of the Complaint based on insufficient evidence. Rather, the "purpose of
the open courts clause is to 'impose some limitation' on the legislature's 'great latitude in
defining, changing, and modernizing the law.'" Craftman Builder's Supply v. Butler,
974 P.2d 1194, 1198 at U 15 (Utah 1999) (citing Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d
670, 676 (Utah 1985)). Thus, the open courts clause has been used to attack laws enacted
by the Utah Legislature, which, for example, impose statute of limitations or damages
caps or abolish causes of action. See e.g., Craftman Builder's Supply, supra, (statute of
repose); Berry, supra, (products liability statute of repose); Hirpa v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.,
948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997) (abolishing negligence actions against "good Samaritans");
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DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) (governmental immunity); Condemarin v.
University Hospital 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) (damages caps). The open courts clause
is simply not implicated in this case.
Accordingly, the district court's holding of an evidentiary hearing and subsequent
dismissal of the Complaint did not violate the Utah Constitution.

V.

CHASE
MANHATTAN
JOINS IN THE
BRIEF
OF
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE ROBERT C COSBY AND ANY OTHER
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
Pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chase

Manhattan also joins in and adopts by reference briefs filed by Robert C. Cosby and any
other defendant/appellee.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the district court's
dismissal of the Complaint.
DATED this J^V^day of December, 2001.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

JOHN BrWlLSON
LAURA S. SCOTT
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corporation
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UTAH CONSTITUTION
Utah Const. Art I, § 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 10.
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the
jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no
fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors
by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Utah Const. Art I, § 11.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.

UTAH CODE TITLE 57, CHAPTER 2. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

§ 57-2-10. Proof of execution-How made
The proof of the execution of any conveyance whereby real estate is conveyed or
may be affected shall be:
(1) By the testimony of a subscribing witness, if there is one; or,
(2) When all the subscribing witnesses are dead, or cannot be had, by evidence of the
handwriting of the party, and of a subscribing witness, if there is one, given by a credible
witness to each signature.
§ 57-2-11. Witness must be known or identified
No proof by a subscribing witness shall be taken unless such witness shall be
personally known to the officer taking the proof to be the person whose name is subscribed
to the conveyance as a witness thereto, or shall be proved to be such by the oath or
affirmation of a credible witness personally known to such officer.
§ 57-2-12. Certificate of proof by subscribing witness
No certificate of such proof shall be made unless such subscribing witness shall
prove that the person whose name is subscribed thereto as a party is the person described
in, and who executed, the same; that such person executed the conveyance, and that such
person subscribed his name thereto as a witness thereof at the request of the maker of such
instrument.

§ 57-2-13. Form for certificate of proof.
The certificate of proof shall be substantially in the following form, to wit:
State of Utah, County of
On this
(month\day\year), before me personally appeared
, personally
known to me (or satisfactorily proved to me by the oath of
, a competent and credible
witness for that purpose, by me duly sworn) to be the same person whose name is
subscribed to the above instrument as a witness thereto, who, being by me duly sworn,
deposed and said that he resides in
, county of
, and state of Utah; that he was
present and saw
, personally known to him to be the signer of the above instrument as
a party thereto, sign and deliver the same, and heard him acknowledge that he executed the

same, and that he, the deponent, thereupon signed his name as a subscribing witness thereto
at the request of said
.

§ 57-2-14. Proof of handwriting
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the subscribing witness or
witnesses, shall be taken unless the officer taking the same shall be satisfied that all the
subscribing witnesses to such conveyance are dead, out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be had
to prove the execution thereof.
§ 57-2-15. Evidence required for certificate of proof
No certificate of any such proof shall be made unless a competent and credible
witness shall state on oath or affirmation that he personally knew the person whose name is
subscribed thereto as a party, well knows his signature, stating his means of knowledge, and
believes the name of the party subscribed thereto as a party was subscribed by such person;
nor unless a competent and credible witness shall in like manner state that he personally
knew the person whose name is subscribed to such conveyance as a witness, well knows his
signature, stating his means of knowledge, and believes the name subscribed thereto as a
witness was thereto subscribed by such person.
§ 57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness
Upon the application of any grantee in any conveyance required by law to be
recorded, or of any person claiming under such grantee, verified under the oath of the
applicant, that any witness to such conveyance residing in the county where such application
is made refuses to appear and testify touching the execution thereof, and that such
conveyance cannot be proved without his evidence, any officer authori2ed to take the
acknowledgment or proof of such conveyance may issue a subpoena requiring such witness
to appear before such officer and testify touching the execution thereof.
§ 57-2-17. Disobedience of subpoenaed witness-Contempt—Proof aliunde
Every person who, being served with a subpoena, shall without reasonable cause
refuse or neglect to appear, or appearing, shall refuse to answer upon oath touching the
matters aforesaid, shall be liable to the party injured for such damages as may be sustained
by him on account of such neglect or refusal, and may also be dealt with for contempt as
provided by law; but no person shall be required to attend who resides out of the county in
which the proof is to be taken, nor unless his reasonable expenses shall have first been
tendered to him; provided, that if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the officer so
authori2ed to take such acknowledgment that such subscribing witness purposely conceals
himself, or keeps out of the way, so that he cannot be served with a subpoena or taken on

attachment after the use of due diligence to that end, or in case of his continued failure or
refusal to testify for the space of one hour after his appearance shall have been compelled by
process, then said conveyance or other instrument may be proved and admitted to record in
the same manner as if such subscribing witness thereto were dead.

UTAH CODE TITLE 46 (2001). NOTARIZATION AND AUTHENTICATION OF
DOCUMENTS AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES. CHAPTER 1. NOTARIES PUBLIC
REFORM ACT.
(1998)
§ 46-1-2 Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a signer,
whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory
evidence, has admitted, in the notary's presence, having signed a document voluntarily for
its stated purpose.

(2001)
§ 46-1-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a signer,
whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory
evidence, has admitted, and which admission is made either in the presence of the notary or
by an electronic communication that is as reliable as an admission made in the presence of
the notary, provided that the electronic communication is a u t h o r e d by law or rule, signing
a document voluntarily for its stated purpose.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 104. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or title admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect
to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment: of the condition.
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be
conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and so
requests.
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary
matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the case.
(e) Weight and Credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce
before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.

RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.

RULE 611. MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION AND PRESENTATION
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the subject

matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The
court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct
examination.
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony.
Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls
a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party,
interrogation may be by leading questions.

